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ToaTs-lNDuCING BREACH oF CoNTRAcr-ArroRNEv-CLIEm CoNTINGBNT

FEB CoNTRAcr-Plaintiff, a practicing attomey, undertook on a contingent fee
basis to represent a husband and wife in separate claims for damages alleged to
have been suffered by them through the negligence of the driver of a motor
vehicle. The driver was insured under a policy issued by defendant. Defendant had notice of the contract. After plaintiff had started suit on the damage
claim and as the case was about to be tried, defendant's adjusters, without knowledge on the plaintiff's part, allegedly induced the clients to discharge the plaintiff (and "thereby break their contingent fee contract with him") and subsequently to settle their claims with defendant. Plaintiff instituted a tort action
against defendant for maliciously inducing a breach of the contingent fee contract. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff's motion to set aside the order of dismissal. On appeal, held, aflirmed.1 In
an action by an attorney against a third party for inducing the attomey's client
to break a contingent fee contract, the defendant's acts in obtaining an independent settlement are privileged, and therefore not unlawful. Krause v.
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 331 Mich. 19, 49 N. W. (2d) 41 (1951).
Since the famous case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 the courts have steadily expanded3
application of the concept that unlawful interference with contract rights by a
person not a party to the contract is an actionable tort. The elements of the tort
of inducing breach of contract are the existence of the contract; the breach
by X and resultant injury to P; and inducement of the breach by D knowingly,
maliciously,4 and without reasonable justification or cause (i. e., privilege).
Within recent years there have been attempts to apply the principle to the
situation in which a third person, knowing of the existence of an attomeyclient contingent fee contract, procures a settlement with the client, the end

On two grounds, one of which is not pertinent to this note.
2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
s For a thorough analysis of the historical development of this tort, see Sayre, "Inducing
Breach of Contract," 36 H.Ulv. L. REv. 663 (1923). Authority for application of the c:on- ·
cept in Michigan is Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N.W. 869 (1895), and Wilkinson v. Powe, 300 Mich. 275, I N.W. (2d) 539 (1942).
4 The term "malic:e'' of course has been a word of inexact meaning. The Sayre article,
supra note 3, at 675-686, reviews various interpretations of the tenn. In consideration of
this tort, it is generally assumed today that "malice" does not require any actual hostility;
e.g., the court in Klauder v. Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 A. 667 (1937), quoted with approval
the language of the court in Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457 at 460, 141 N.E. 914
(1923): "Maliciousness 'does not necessarily mean actual malice or ill will, but the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social justification.' "
1

2
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result of which is to deprive the attorney of his fee. 5 Occasionally recovery
has been allowed. 6 However, two important obstacles confront the attorney
in bringing such an action. One is identification of a breach of the contract. 7
In the principal case the plaintiff alleged that the client's act in discharging
him amounted to a breach. It is well established that ~ client may discharge
his attorney at any time, even if the attorney is without fault, 8 because of the
policy which recognizes the inherently confidential nature of the attorney-client
relationship. Such discharge, ho\\'.ever, gives the attorney a cause of action,
on either a quantum meruit9 or breach of contract10 basis. In jurisdictions
in which the attorney is relegated to a claim for the reasonable value of his
services, a discharge by the client does not constitute a breach of the contract;11
and since there is no breach, it should follow that an action for inducing breach
of contract would not lie, under facts similar to those of the principal case.
However, under the "majority rule"12-that a discharge without cause amounts
to a breach of contract giving the attorney an action for the breach-it would
seem that the attorney could also rely upon such discharge in bringing an action
for inducing a breach. Beyond this first difficulty, an attorney faces a second
hurdle: the courts will direct particular attention to determining whether the
defendant has acted with reasonable justification, so as to make his acts privileged and not unlawful. Settlements and compromise are looked upon with high
favor by the courts; mere negotiations between defendant and client designed
to produce a settlement justifiably wear the cloak of privilege, even though
the attorney is indirectly injured. The attorney's rights do not limit the right
of the client to seek a settlement of his owri.13 But if the defendant purposively instigated the settlement with the client with specific intent to ''bilk
5 illustrative decisions which have denied liability in such an action are Cameron v.
Barancik, 173 ill. App. 23 (1912); Hebbits v. Constitution Indemnity Co., 279 Mass. 539,
181 N.E. 723 (1932); Wahl v. Strous, 344 Pa. 402, 25 A. (2d) 820 (1942); Barnes v.
Quigley, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 49 A. (2d) 467.
6 E.g., Keels v. Powell, 207 S.C. 97, 34 S.E. (2d) 482 (1945); Lurie v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 270 N.Y. 379, l N.E. (2d) 472 (1936); Klauder v. Cregar, supra note
4; Bennett v. Sinclair-Nav. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 14.
7 Courts permitting recovery have recognized as a breach by the client such acts as a
"repudiation" of the contract, Lurie v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., supra note 6; abandoning the lawyer to save the fee, State Farm Fire Insurance Co. v. Gregory, (4th Cir. 1950)
184 F. (2d) 447; withholding of entire sum obtained in settlement, Klauder v. Cregar, supra
note 4; selling judgment to defendant, Hogue v. Sparks, 146 Ark. 174, 225 S.W. 291
(1925).
8 See annotation, 136 A.L.R. 231 (1942).
9Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, ll4 N.E. 46 (1916).
10 For an enlightening examination of the judicial attitude in Pennsylvania, see 54
D.rcx. L. RBv. 465 (1950), wherein the author concludes that both bases have been adopted
at one time or another in Pennsylvania decisions.
11 The plaintiff's theory in the principal case, as stated by him in his brief, was that,
"Had the Paquins settled their claims, without being induced by defendant to discharge
plaintiff, the latter's remedy would have been confined solely to pursuit of his right to an
attorney's lien. This, however, is not the situation in the instant case. Defendant did commit a wrong, both in fact and in law, by inducing the breach ..••" Plaintiff's brief, p. 8.
12s0 called in 30 YALE L.J. 514 at 517,(1921).
13 A clause in an attorney-client contract prohibiting settlement without the attorney's
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a lawyer out of his fee,"14 his conduct should not be considered privileged.
The line of privilege is difficult to draw; however, mere allegations of inducing
settlemeni; or discharge and settlement, should not warrant recovery. Thus
the attorney must show that there has been a breach by the client, and that
the defendant's conduct has been of such a nature as to lose its privileged
character. In the principal case the court, quoting from other opinions, apparently reasoned that neither element had been satisfactorily established, although
its own language emphasized privilege. From the decisions it appears that
the attorney will find recovery based on such a tort very difficult, unless the
conduct of the defendant has been deliberately and willfully directed toward
depriving the attorney of his rights. This approach seems well-grounded15 in
view of the premium which the law places on settling claims out of court.

Richard W. Pogue

consent is generally considered void as against public policy. Nichols v. Waters, 201 Mich.
27, 167 N.W. 1 (1918).
14 Language from the opinion
15 For an article encouraging

in Barnes v. Quigley, supra note 5.
liability for interference with attorney-client contractual
relationships in such cases, see Blackwell, "Interference with Contract for Attorney's Fees as
Cause of Action," 9 SELDEN. Soc. YEAll. BooK (Univ. of South Carolina) Pt. II, p. 31
(Feb. 1948).
.

